Investment results in the control category have tobe measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buyingtakes time. If needed, strengthening management, redirecting theutilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale ormerger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to bemeasured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls,we are looking for wide margins of profit—if it appears at allclose, we quitclaim.
控制型股票的投資結(jié)果應(yīng)該以幾年為基礎(chǔ)來衡量。花費(fèi)時(shí)間適度購買。如果需要，強(qiáng)化管理，改變資本的使用方向，或許造成滿意的資產(chǎn)清理或者并購等等，所有這些因素道指這個(gè)應(yīng)該用數(shù)年而不是數(shù)月為基礎(chǔ)來衡量。出于這個(gè)原因，在控制型股票中，我們尋求更高的超額收益——如果這看起來需要不惜一切代價(jià)，我們就放棄這個(gè)可控制的權(quán)力。
Controls in the buying stage move largely insympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is gearedmore to that of workouts.
控制型的股票買進(jìn)階段同道指有著很強(qiáng)的相關(guān)性。在后期，它們的表現(xiàn)就要遠(yuǎn)超投機(jī)型購票。
You might be interested to know that the buyers ofour former control situation, Dempster Mill Manufacturing, seem tobe doing very well with it. This fulfills our expectation and is asource of satisfaction. An investment operation that depends on theultimate buyer making a bum deal (in Wall Street they call this the“Bigger Fool Theory”) is tenuous indeed. How much more satisfactoryit is to buy at really bargain prices so that only an averagedisposition brings pleasant results.
你可能有興趣了解我們之前購買的控制型股票，登普斯特軋機(jī)制造看起來做的很好。這實(shí)現(xiàn)了我們的預(yù)期并且結(jié)果令人滿意。投資運(yùn)作指望最厚的買家做出無價(jià)值的交易（在華爾街他們叫做“更大的傻瓜理論”）實(shí)在是不可靠的。如果以令人滿意的低價(jià)格買入股票，那么只要是平均的心理波動(dòng)就會帶來令人滿意的結(jié)果。
As I have mentioned in the past, the division ofour portfolio among categories is largely determined by theaccident of availability. Therefore, in any given year the mixbetween generals, workouts, or controls is largely a matter ofchance, and this fickle factor will have a great deal to do withour performance relative to the Dow. This is one of many reasonswhy a single year’s performance is of minor importance and, good orbad, should never be taken too seriously.
在過去我曾提到過，我們投資組合在這幾種類型股票的占比是很大程度上有隨機(jī)因素導(dǎo)致。所以，在每個(gè)年份對于低估值型、投資型和控制型的股票的占比都是機(jī)會的問題，并且這樣易變的因素會對我們相對于道指的表現(xiàn)產(chǎn)生很大的影響。這就是解釋如下問題的原因之一：單獨(dú)一年的表現(xiàn)好或壞不應(yīng)該被看得很重。
To give an example of just how important theaccident of division between these categories is, let me cite theexample of the past three years. Using an entirely different methodof calculation than that used to measure the performance of BPL inentirety, whereby the average monthly investment at market value bycategory is utilized, borrowed money and office operating expensesexcluded, etc., (this gives the most accurate basis for intergroupcomparisons but does not reflect overall BPL results) the generals(both present categories combined), workouts, and the Dow, shape upas follows:
為了舉例說明機(jī)遇對不同種類股票持有比例的重要影響，我引用了過去三年的數(shù)據(jù)。我們運(yùn)用與衡量BPL整體狀況完全不同的方法來估算，平均每月投資于股票市場的價(jià)值被分類計(jì)算，取出借入資金和營運(yùn)費(fèi)用等等的影響（這給了每組對照數(shù)據(jù)在精確的基礎(chǔ)，但是不能反映BPL整體水平），低估值型股票（兩種都包含在內(nèi)）、投機(jī)型股票和道指都如下列示：
Year | Generals | Workouts | Dow |
1962 | -1% | +14.6% | -8.6% |
1963 | +20.5% | +30.6% | +18.4% |
1964 | +27.8% | +10.3% | +16.7% |
Obviously the workouts (along with controls) savedthe day in 1962, and if we had been light in this category thatyear, our final result would have been much poorer, although stillquite respectable considering market conditions during the year. Wecould just as well have had a much smaller percentage of ourportfolio in workouts that year; availability decided it, not anynotion on my part as to what the market was going to do. Therefore,it is important to realize that in 1962 we were just plain luckyregarding mix of categories.
很顯然投機(jī)型股票（同控制型股票）拯救了我們1962年的表現(xiàn)，并且如果我們持有投機(jī)型股票數(shù)量很少，那么我們的結(jié)果就會更加差，雖然考慮到當(dāng)年股票市場行情表現(xiàn)也是非常不錯(cuò)的。我們今年對投機(jī)型股票的持有比例會減少，我們的決定不是根據(jù)任何市場的意圖變化去決定。然而，值得注意的是1962年我們的投資組合是非常幸運(yùn)的。
In 1963 we had one sensational workout whichgreatly influenced results, and generals gave a good account ofthemselves, resulting in a banner year. If workouts had beennormal, (say, more like 1962) we would have looked much poorercompared to the Dow. Here it wasn’t our mix that did much for us,but rather excellent situations.
在1963年我們有一個(gè)非常好的投機(jī)類股票，它大幅的影響了我們的結(jié)果，并且低估值型購票也在股票市場向好的一年有著不錯(cuò)的表現(xiàn)。如果投機(jī)類品種表現(xiàn)平常（像是1962年的水平）我們相對于道指的表現(xiàn)就不會這么好。這時(shí)并不是我們的主動(dòng)混合的投資比例造成了我們的高收益，而是出色地市場表現(xiàn)幫了我們一把。
Finally, in 1964 workouts were a big drag onperformance. This would be normal in any event during a big plusyear for the Dow such as 1964, but they were even a greater dragthan expected because of mediocre experience. In retrospect itwould have been pleasant to have been entirely in generals, but wedon’t play the game in retrospect.
最后，在1964年投機(jī)型股票給我們的總體表現(xiàn)拖了后腿。這對于任何一年有著像1964年表現(xiàn)的股票市場來說是正常的，但是它們比我們根據(jù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)預(yù)期的拖后了我們更多?；仡櫷拢覀?nèi)绻砍钟械凸乐档墓善蔽覀兊氖忠粨]更好，但是我們不玩回顧往事的游戲。
I hope the preceding table drives home the pointthat results in a given year are subject to many variables—someregarding which we have little control or insight. We consider allcategories to be good businesses and we are very happy we haveseveral to rely on rather than just one. It makes for morediscrimination within each category and reduces the chance we willbe put completely out of operation by the elimination ofopportunities in a single category.
我希望上面的表格說明了一年中的表現(xiàn)受控于很多變量的影響——部分決定于我們的不能控制或洞察的因素。我們認(rèn)為這些分類都是好的生意，并且我們非常高興我們以來的是多類型的股票而不是單一類型。這建立于每個(gè)類別之間的顯著差異，這會幫助我們降低由于單個(gè)類別的整體運(yùn)營損失而帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
Taxes
稅收
We have had a chorus of groans this year regardingpartners’ tax liabilities. Of course, we also might have had a fewif the tax sheet had gone out blank.
對于今年合伙人的稅負(fù)問題我們非常的滿意。當(dāng)然，如果納稅申報(bào)表不是空白，我們還是要交稅的。
More investment sins are probably committed byotherwise quite intelligent people because of “tax considerations”than from any other cause. One of my friends - a noted West Coastphilosopher- maintains that a majority of life’s errors are causedby forgetting what one is really trying to do. This is certainlythe case when an emotionally supercharged element like taxes entersthe picture (I have another friend - a noted East Coast philosopherwho says it isn’t the lack of representation he minds - it’s thetaxation).
其他的聰明的投資人很可能會因?yàn)椤岸愂盏目紤]”而不是其他原因而犯下更多的投資罪惡。我的一個(gè)朋友-一個(gè)在西海岸著名的哲學(xué)家-總結(jié)說人生大部分的錯(cuò)誤都是由于忘記了自己要做什么造成的。這就是那種情況，當(dāng)一個(gè)像稅收這樣感覺上過分收取的情況出現(xiàn)。（我有另外一個(gè)朋友—一個(gè)東海岸著名的哲學(xué)家，他說并不是缺少思想上的表現(xiàn)而是稅收導(dǎo)致。）
Let’s get back to the West Coast. What is onereally trying to do in the investment world? Not pay the leasttaxes, although that may be a factor to be considered in achievingthe end. Means and end should not be confused, however, and the endis to come away with the largest after-tax rate of compound. Quiteobviously if two courses of action promise equal rates of pre-taxcompound and one involves incurring taxes and the other doesn’t,the latter course is superior. However, we find this is rarely thecase.
讓我們回到西海岸。一個(gè)人真正想再投資世界干的是什么？并不是為了達(dá)到最少的稅收，雖然這可能是為了達(dá)到最終目標(biāo)所要考慮的因素。方法和終點(diǎn)不應(yīng)該被混淆，但是，終點(diǎn)是要追求最大的稅后復(fù)合增長率。很明顯的是，如果兩種保證產(chǎn)生相同的稅前增長率，一種要交稅而另一種不用交稅，后者的增長率高更快。但是我們發(fā)現(xiàn)這種事情是非常少發(fā)生的。
It is extremely improbable that 20 stocks selectedfrom, say, 3000 choices are going to prove to be the optimumportfolio both now and a year from now at the entirely differentprices (both for the selections and the alternatives) prevailing atthat later date. If our objective is to produce the maximumafter-tax compound rate, we simply have to own the most attractivesecurities obtainable at current prices. And, with 3, 000 ratherrapidly shifting variables, this must mean change (hopefully“tax-generating” change).
要在3000只股票中選出20只股票做成適宜的投資組合并且保證目前最優(yōu)而在一年后表現(xiàn)出非常好的價(jià)格增長（包括可選的股票和可替換的股票）并且在日后繼續(xù)高增長是極度不可能的。如果我們的目標(biāo)是創(chuàng)造最大的稅后復(fù)合增長率，我們只需要簡單地買入現(xiàn)在的價(jià)格最具有吸引力的股票。因?yàn)橛兄?/span>3000個(gè)快速變化的變量，所以變化是必須的（希望是“稅收產(chǎn)生”的變化）。
It is obvious that the performance of a stock lastyear or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to notown it now. It is obvious that an inability to “get even” in asecurity that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious thatthe inner warm glow that results from having held a winner lastyear is of no importance in making a decision as to whether itbelongs in an optimum portfolio this year.
不管你是否擁有這只股票，他在去年或者上個(gè)月的表現(xiàn)在本質(zhì)上是顯然沒有意義的。顯然，一只股票經(jīng)過下跌后能夠有能力再漲回去也是不重要的。顯然，因?yàn)槿ツ甑氖斋@而使得現(xiàn)在的內(nèi)在熱度的增長對決策今年是否將其納入最有證券組合沒有價(jià)值。
If gains are involved, changing portfoliosinvolves paying taxes. Except in very unusual cases (I will readilyadmit there are some cases), the amount of the tax is of minorimportance if the difference in expectable performance issignificant. I have never been able to understand why the tax comesas such a body blow to many people since the rate on long-termcapital gain is lower than on most lines of endeavor (tax policyindicates digging ditches is regarded as socially less desirablethan shuffling stock certificates).
如果取得收益，那么改變投資組合就會需要繳稅。除了一些少數(shù)不正常的情況外（我很可以的承認(rèn)會有那些情況），如果投資組合的預(yù)期收益有巨大的差別，那么繳稅的多少就會沒有太大意義。我始終無法理解為什么這么多人看待稅收像是一記重拳，雖然長期資本成本來看它比許多激進(jìn)的行為要低（稅收政策表明深度挖掘此事不如緩慢地持有股票權(quán)證更可?。?/span>
I have a large percentage of pragmatists in theaudience so I had better get off that idealistic kick. There areonly three ways to avoid ultimately paying the tax: (1) die withthe asset - and that’s a little too ultimate for me—even thezealots would have to view this “cure” with mixed emotions; (2)give the asset away -.you certainly don’t pay any taxes this way,but of course you don’t pay for any groceries, rent, etc. , either;and (3) lose back the gain - if your mouth waters at thistax-saver, I have to admire you - you certainly have the courage ofyour convictions.
我的讀者的大部分是實(shí)用主義者，所以我最好丟下理想主義的教棒。有3種方法去避免最終的稅務(wù)支出：（1）跟資產(chǎn)一起滅亡——這是有點(diǎn)超越我的極限了——即使是最狂熱的人看待這個(gè)方法時(shí)也是抱著復(fù)雜的心情。（2）將資產(chǎn)送人——這種方式下你肯定不用繳稅，但是當(dāng)然你也不會為雜貨、房租等等支付金錢。（3）將受益再賠回去——如果你的這種節(jié)稅人，我必須佩服你，你肯定有足夠的勇氣來堅(jiān)持你的信念。
So it is going to continue to be the policy of BPLto try to maximize investment gains, not minimize taxes. We will doour level best to create the maximum revenue for the Treasury - atthe lowest rates the rules will allow.
所以下面繼續(xù)說明BPL達(dá)到最大的投資收益的策略，不是最小化稅務(wù)支出。我們會盡我們的所能以規(guī)定內(nèi)的最低利率為我們的國庫創(chuàng)造最大的額收入。
An interesting sidelight on this whole business oftaxes, vis-a-vis investment management, has appeared in the lastfew years. This has arisen through the creation of so-called “swapfunds” which are investment companies created by the exchange ofthe investment company’s shares for general market securities heldby potential investors. The dominant sales argument has been thedeferment (deferment, when pronounced by an enthusiastic salesman,sometimes comes very close phonetically to elimination) of capitalgains taxes while trading a single security for a diversifiedportfolio. The tax will only finally be paid when the swap fund’sshares are redeemed. For the lucky ones, it will be avoidedentirely when any of those delightful alternatives mentioned twoparagraphs earlier eventuates.
在最后的幾年中，在整個(gè)生意的稅務(wù)和投資管理展現(xiàn)出了有趣的一面。這個(gè)的興起來源于所謂的“互惠基金”，它是由投資公司創(chuàng)造的用投資公司的股票換取普通股票市場潛在投資者持有的證券。主導(dǎo)銷售學(xué)說認(rèn)為當(dāng)交易一種股票來代表一個(gè)多樣化的投資組合時(shí)推延（推延，當(dāng)被熱情的銷售人員宣稱時(shí)，有時(shí)候在語言上非常接近消除）了資本利得稅。稅務(wù)支出只有當(dāng)互惠基金被贖回時(shí)才會發(fā)生。如果幸運(yùn)的話，當(dāng)在第二段提及的令人欣喜的所有的備選股票都有很好的結(jié)果那么稅務(wù)支出將完全被避免。
The reasoning implicit in the swapee’s action israther interesting. He obviously doesn’t really want to hold whathe is holding or he wouldn’t jump at the chance to swap it (and paya fairly healthy commission - usually 4% up to $100, 000) for agrab-bag of similar hot potatoes held by other tax-numbedinvestors. In all fairness, I should point out that after allofferees have submitted their securities for exchange and had achance to review the proposed portfolio, they have a chance to backout, but I understand a relatively small proportion doso.
Swapee的行為隱含的原因更加的有趣。他顯然不想持有他現(xiàn)在持有的股票或者他不會抓住機(jī)會去拿這些股票（并且支付一個(gè)合理的傭金—通常4%到10萬美元）交換其他對稅收麻木的投資者持有的燙手的山芋。完全公平的看，我要指出的是雖然被邀約人已經(jīng)提出他們的股票置換要求，也有可能看一下推薦的投資組合，他們?nèi)匀挥锌赡芡顺?，但是我理解只有一小部分人這樣做的原因。
There have been twelve such funds (that I know of)established since origination of the idea in 1960, and several moreare currently in the works. The idea is not without appeal sincesales totaled well over $600 million. All of the funds retain aninvestment manager to whom they usually pay ? of 1% of asset value.This investment manager faces an interesting problem; he is paid tomanage the fund intelligently (in each of the five largest fundsthis fee currently ranges from $250, 000 to $700, 000 per year),but because of the low tax basis inherited from the contributors ofsecurities, virtually his every move creates capital gains taxliabilities. And, of course, he knows that if he incurs suchliabilities, he is doing so for people who are probably quitesensitive to taxes or they wouldn’t own shares in the swap fund inthe first place.
據(jù)我所知自從這個(gè)想法1960年起源，有12個(gè)這樣的基金成立，現(xiàn)在有更多的基金在從事這樣工作。自從銷售規(guī)模超過6億這個(gè)概念就沒有缺乏過吸引力。所有這些資金被一個(gè)投資經(jīng)理控制，這將花費(fèi)0.5%-1%的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值支付給投資經(jīng)理。這個(gè)投資經(jīng)理面對著一個(gè)有趣的問題；他被花錢雇來聰明的管理這個(gè)基金（在最大的五家基金中這個(gè)費(fèi)用目前每年從25萬美元到70萬美元見波動(dòng)），但是由于證券提供者繼承來的低稅率基礎(chǔ)，實(shí)際上他每次的運(yùn)作都會帶了資本利得稅的負(fù)擔(dān)。并且，當(dāng)然，他知道如果他引發(fā)了這樣的債務(wù)，他在為投資人做的事情，而這些人很可能是對稅收嫉妒敏感的人，如果不是這樣他們就不會把互惠基金放在投資的首要位置。
I am putting all of this a bit strongly, and I amsure there are some cases where a swap fund may be the best answerto an individual’s combined tax and investment problems.Nevertheless, I feel they offer a very interesting test-tube tomeasure the ability of some of the most respected investmentadvisors when they are trying to manage money without paying(significant) taxes.
我堅(jiān)強(qiáng)有力的展現(xiàn)了它的全部，并且我相信會有一些情形下互惠基金可以更好的解決個(gè)人投資者的稅務(wù)和投資問題。然而，我感覺他們提供了一個(gè)很有趣的試管來測量那些非常受尊重的投資顧問的能力——當(dāng)他們努力管理資金時(shí)要想著不能支付太多的稅金。
The three largest swap funds were all organized in1961, and combined have assets now of about $300 million. One ofthese, Diversification Fund, reports on a fiscal year basis whichmakes extraction of relevant data quite difficult for calendar yearcomparisons. The other two, Federal Street Fund and WestminsterFund (respectively first and third largest in the group) aremanaged by investment advisors who oversee at least $2 billion ofinstitutional money.
三家最大的互惠基金成立于1961年，合計(jì)擁有資產(chǎn)大約3個(gè)億。其中之一，多樣化基金，他的會計(jì)年度編制基礎(chǔ)使得他與可比數(shù)據(jù)很難按年份比較。其余兩個(gè)，聯(lián)邦街基金和威斯敏斯特基金（各自是這個(gè)小組中第一和第三資產(chǎn)規(guī)模的基金）被投資顧問管理著，并且他們管理的資金理論上至少有20億美元。
Here’s how they shape up for all full years ofexistence:
下面列示了他們幾年的成果：
Year | Federal Street | Westminster | Dow |
1962 | -19.0% | -22.5% | -7.6% |
1963 | +17.0% | +18.7% | +20.6% |
1964 | +13.8% | +12.3% | +18.7% |
Annual compounded rate | 2.6 | 1.1 | 9.8 |
This is strictly the management record: Noallowance has been made for the commission in entering and anytaxes paid by the fund on behalf of the shareholders have beenadded back to performance.
這是嚴(yán)格的管理層記錄：這沒有加入對投資者的分紅和因?yàn)槎愂諏?dǎo)致的投資者的收益減少的影響。
Miscellaneous
各方面的事情
In the December 21st issue of AUTOMOTIVE NEWS itwas reported that Ford Motor Co. plans to spend $700 million in1965 to add 6,742,000 square feet to its facilities throughout theworld. Buffett Partnership, Ltd., never far behind, plans to add227 ? square feet to its facilities in the spring of1965;
在12月21日的汽車新聞中報(bào)道福特汽車公司打算用7個(gè)億在全世界范圍內(nèi)擴(kuò)展6,742,000平方英尺的機(jī)器設(shè)備。BPL從不落后，打算在1965年春天增加227.25平方英尺的辦公住所。
Our growth in net assets from $105,100 (there’s noprize for guessing who put in the $100) on May 5, 1956, when thefirst predecessor limited partnership (Buffett Associates, Ltd.)was organized, to $26,074,000 on 1/1/65 creates the need for anoccasional reorganization in internal routine. Therefore, roughlycontemporaneously with the bold move from 682 to 909 ? square feet,a highly capable man is going to join our organization withresponsibility for the administrative (and certain other)functions. This move will particularly serve to free up more ofBill Scott’s time for security analysis which is his forte. I’llhave more to report on this in the midyear letter.
我們的凈資產(chǎn)從1956年5月5日的創(chuàng)始有限合伙企業(yè)的10.51萬美元（猜測誰投入了100美元是沒有獎(jiǎng)品的）增長到1965年1月1日的2607.4萬美元，這也使得我們內(nèi)部的臨時(shí)改組有了必要性。所以，與辦公場所由從682漲到909.25平方英尺同時(shí)，一個(gè)非常有能力的人要加入我們的組織，并且負(fù)責(zé)行政管理（某些其他的）運(yùn)作。這可以為比爾斯克特騰出更多的去研究股票，而這正是比爾擅長的。我會在年中的信中作更多的匯報(bào)。
Bill (who continues to do a terrific job) and hiswife have an investment in the Partnership of $298, 749, a verylarge majority of their net worth. Our new associate (his name isbeing withheld until his present employer has replaced him), alongwith his wife and children, has made an important investment in thePartnership. Susie and I presently have an interest of $3,406,700in BPL which represents virtually our entire net worth, with theexception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card Co., alocal company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10stockholders. Additionally, my relatives, consisting of threechildren, mother, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law,four aunts, four cousins and six nieces and nephews, have interestsin BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $1, 942, 592. So we allcontinue to eat home cooking.
比爾（他繼續(xù)做著非常出色的工作）和他的妻子在一個(gè)合伙企業(yè)中有289,749的投資，這占到了他們凈資產(chǎn)的一大部分。我們的新同事（他的名字在他現(xiàn)任老板找到替代人選前要保密）和他的妻子和孩子對合伙企業(yè)做出了重要的投資。蘇西和我現(xiàn)在擁有BPL中的3,406,700美元，這是是我們凈資產(chǎn)的全部，但是除了我們持續(xù)持有的中陸標(biāo)簽卡片公司，這是一家當(dāng)?shù)毓?，是我?/span>1960年當(dāng)它的股東不足10人時(shí)買入的。另外，我的親屬們，包括我的三個(gè)孩子，母親，兩個(gè)姐姐，兩個(gè)姐夫，岳父，四個(gè)姨，4個(gè)堂兄，6個(gè)侄子侄女在BPL中享有利益，間接或者直接的總共1,942,592美元。所以我們都在繼續(xù)吃著自家做的飯。
We continue to represent the ultimate in seasonalbusinesses—open one day a year. This creates real problems inkeeping the paper flowing smoothly but, Beth and Donna continue todo an outstanding job of coping with this and otherproblems.
我們繼續(xù)代表著季節(jié)性生意的基本原則——每年開門一次。這給保持報(bào)表平滑帶來了真實(shí)的麻煩，但是貝絲和唐娜繼續(xù)在這項(xiàng)工作和其他問題方面做著出色的工作。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has distinguished itselfin its usual vital role of finding out what belongs to whom. Wecontinue to throw impossible deadlines at them—and they continue toperform magnificently. You will note in their certificate this yearthat they have implemented the new procedure whereby they nowpounce on us unannounced twice a year in addition to the regularyearend effort.
Peat, Marwick和Mitchell在平凡的崗位做出了突出的成績，他們的工作是找出哪些資產(chǎn)屬于誰。我們持續(xù)的給他們一些對他們來說不可能的截止日期——他們表現(xiàn)出了持續(xù)的卓越。今年你們會注意到他們的證書，
Finally - and most sincerely - let me thank youpartners who cooperate magnificently in getting things to uspromptly and properly and thereby maximize the time we can spendworking where we should be - by the cash register. I am extremelyfortunate in being able to spend the great majority of my timethinking about where our money should be invested, rather thangetting bogged down in the minute that seems to overwhelm so manybusiness entities. We have an organizational structure which makesthis efficiency a possibility, and more importantly, we have agroup of partners that make it a reality. For this, I am mostappreciative and we are all wealthier.
最后，最真誠的感謝你們--我的合伙人，你們迅速適當(dāng)?shù)膶⑿畔⒎从辰o我，讓我有了最充足的時(shí)間你干我們應(yīng)該做的工作—收錢。我非常幸運(yùn)的可以有大量的時(shí)間去思考我們的錢應(yīng)該投資于哪里，而不是被這么多的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)體的拖累而停滯不前。我們有一個(gè)組織框架可以使得高效是有可能的，更重要的是，我們又一群合伙人使得這變成了現(xiàn)實(shí)。出于這點(diǎn)，我發(fā)自肺腑的感謝并期待我們共同財(cái)富增長。
Our past policy has been to admit close relativesof present partners without a minimum capital limitation. This yeara flood of children, grandchildren, etc., appeared which calledthis policy into question; therefore, I have decided to institute a$25,000 minimum on interests of immediate relatives of presentpartners.
過去的政策是允許現(xiàn)有的近親屬合伙人以沒有最小資金限制投入資本。今年一大批兒子輩和孫輩等等的孩子們使這個(gè)政策出現(xiàn)了麻煩。所以，我決定對現(xiàn)有的近親屬合伙人指定一個(gè)2.5萬美元的增資下限。
Within the coming two weeks you willreceive:
(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL informationneeded for your 1964 federal income tax return. This letter is theonly item that counts for tax purposes.
(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &Co. for 1964, setting forth the operations and financial positionof BPL as well as your own capital account.
(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the statusof your BPL interest on 1/1/65. This is identical with the figuredeveloped in the audit.
(4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreementlisting all partners.
在接下來的一周你會收到：
(1)一封信，關(guān)于BPL1964年聯(lián)邦稅務(wù)返還的所有信息。這封信只是為了稅務(wù)目的計(jì)算而用。
(2)對Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 和公司1964年的審計(jì)報(bào)告，列明BPL公司的運(yùn)營和財(cái)務(wù)狀況和每個(gè)合伙人的資金賬戶。
(3)有我簽署的信，列明了你1965年1月1日在BPL的紅利狀態(tài)。這與審計(jì)報(bào)告中的梳理相同。
(4) A計(jì)劃表:給合伙企業(yè)協(xié)議內(nèi)列示的所有的合伙人寄出。
Let Bill or me know if anything needs clarifying.Even with our splendid staff, our growth means there is more chanceof missent letters, overlooked instructions, a name skipped over, afigure transposition, etc. , so speak up if you have any questionat all that we might have erred. My next letter will be about July15th, summarizing the first half bf this year.
如果有什么需要闡明，讓我知道。隨著我們的發(fā)展，寄錯(cuò)信的概率會增大，一個(gè)名字的確實(shí)或者字母的錯(cuò)位等等。所以說如果你發(fā)現(xiàn)了這樣的情況，可能是由于我們犯了錯(cuò)誤。
下一封信將會在7月15日概括說明上半年的情況
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
