在投資中，巴菲特逐漸體會到了復(fù)利的威力。實(shí)際上，巴菲特最終成為首富就是靠長期高速的復(fù)利增長。關(guān)于復(fù)利的威力這一點(diǎn)，巴菲特在32歲的時(shí)候就非常清楚。 I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately $30,000. This has been considered at least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital. Without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from finding a new hemisphere, it must be pointed out that even had squatter's rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly another IBM. Figured very roughly, the $30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like $2,000,000,000,000 (that's $2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point.
我從不太可靠的消息來源得知，當(dāng)年西班牙女王伊薩貝拉資助哥倫布遠(yuǎn)航的成本大約是3萬美金。這被認(rèn)為至少是一個相當(dāng)成功的運(yùn)用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的例子。不考慮發(fā)現(xiàn)一個新半球的精神上的收獲，即使算上強(qiáng)占的土地的權(quán)利，這個投資也比不上IBM的例子。簡單估算，3萬美金投入4%復(fù)利增長，到了1962年將會是2萬億美元。同情曼哈頓島的印第安人的人們也會找到類似的計(jì)算。這種奇異的幾何級數(shù)增長揭示了兩種事物的價(jià)值：長壽或者讓你的金錢以相當(dāng)好的速度復(fù)利增長。我對前一個事情沒什么可講的。
The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums over a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over adecade or two.
下面的表格顯示的是10萬美元以5%，10%和15%的速度復(fù)利增長10，20和30年。讓人吃驚的是，相對較小的速度差別，經(jīng)過多年的積累，逐漸變?yōu)榫薮蟮臄?shù)字差異。這就是為什么雖然我們的目標(biāo)是更高的增長，但我們感覺，對于道指的幾個點(diǎn)的優(yōu)勢是非常有價(jià)值的成就。假以時(shí)日，10年或20年，這意味著很多錢。
（1962年給合伙人的信）
Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000.
由于復(fù)利這個話題牽扯的范圍很廣，我就試著把這個討論轉(zhuǎn)向藝術(shù)世界，來引入一門小課程。1540年，法國的弗蘭西斯一世花了4000克朗把達(dá)芬奇的蒙娜麗莎買下。你們可能沒關(guān)注克朗的波動，這4000克朗相當(dāng)于今天的2萬美金。
If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That's $1 quadrillionor over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase of paintings qualifying as an investment.
如果弗蘭西斯還活著，他（和他的受托人）當(dāng)時(shí)能夠找到一個稅后6%的投資，這筆財(cái)產(chǎn)現(xiàn)在會價(jià)值超過1000萬億。這是目前國債的3000倍，都是從這6%而來。我相信這將結(jié)束所有家庭中關(guān)于購買畫作算不算投資的討論。
?。?963年給合伙人的信）
基金無法戰(zhàn)勝市場 巴菲特發(fā)現(xiàn)即使是領(lǐng)先的大基金也無法戰(zhàn)勝市場指數(shù)。他認(rèn)為這源于這些投資機(jī)構(gòu)的機(jī)制。 The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality,etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market.
這些結(jié)果繼續(xù)顯示，那些獲得最高額收入和最受尊敬的投資建議也很難比得上一個無人管理的藍(lán)籌股指數(shù)的業(yè)績。這并不是指責(zé)這些機(jī)構(gòu)或投資顧問，以及與這些投資公司有著大體上類似的方法、推理，和結(jié)果的信托部門。這些機(jī)構(gòu)給成百萬的投資者起到了重要的服務(wù)作用，以獲得足夠的分散投資，提供便利，讓人感到踏實(shí)，避免質(zhì)量低下的問題等。但是，他們的服務(wù)不包括（在大部分情況下也不聲稱包括）以高于市場的速度復(fù)利增長金錢。
Our partnership's fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly can not represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we don't achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation.
我們的合伙基金存在的根本原因就是要以高于平均水平的速度復(fù)利增長基金，而且與上面所說的投資公司相比，我們要有更少的長期資本損失的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我們當(dāng)然無法聲稱會達(dá)到這一目標(biāo)。我們能說的而且是確實(shí)說的是，除了在長時(shí)間的投機(jī)性牛市中，如果我們在相當(dāng)長的一段時(shí)期內(nèi)，達(dá)不到這一目標(biāo)，我們將停止運(yùn)營。
（1963年上半年給合伙人的信）
The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: "Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4)literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?" (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year's experience -twenty times.”)
這些重復(fù)出現(xiàn)的表格讓一些合伙人不禁問道：“這些聰明的投資經(jīng)理究竟怎么了？他們有（1）聰明而精力充沛的手下（2）幾乎無限的資源（3）最廣泛的商業(yè)聯(lián)系（4）加在一起幾個世紀(jì)的投資經(jīng)驗(yàn)?！保ㄟ@最后一點(diǎn)讓我想起一個家伙在求職時(shí)聲稱有20年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。后來前任雇主糾正說是“1年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，20次”。）
This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attacking this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States.
這個問題極其重要。你可能會認(rèn)為投資經(jīng)理和大投資者們對這個議題有著很多的研究。畢竟300億美元的百分之一就是一年3億美元。令人好奇的是，實(shí)際上在華爾街沒有任何文章探討這個問題。在證券分析師會議和講座等活動中也幾乎沒有討論。我的想法是，任何一個投資管理機(jī)構(gòu)的首要任務(wù)都是分析自己的技術(shù)和結(jié)果，而不是判斷整個美國的主要投資機(jī)構(gòu)的管理能力和業(yè)績。
In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations;(3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational;and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.
在大多數(shù)情況下，投資機(jī)構(gòu)缺乏超越無人管理的指數(shù)的業(yè)績，甚至連與指數(shù)一致的業(yè)績都少見。這絕不是由于缺少智慧或者誠信。我認(rèn)為這主要是以下幾個原因的結(jié)果：（1）集體決策-我的可能有些偏頗的看法是：如果所有成員都真正參與決策，出色的投資管理幾乎不可能從任何大小的集體中產(chǎn)生。（2）希望與其它備受尊重的大型投資機(jī)構(gòu)的投資政策保持一致，甚至在某種程度上與其投資組合保持一致。（3）機(jī)構(gòu)的體制讓平均成為“安全”。對個人的回報(bào)與激勵無法補(bǔ)償獨(dú)立行動所帶來的全面風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。（4）拘于某些不合理的分散投資做法。最后，也是最重要的是（5）惰性。
?。?964年給合伙人的信）
關(guān)于保守的問題 那些著名的大型投資公司，號稱保守，以傳統(tǒng)的方式行事。但巴菲特認(rèn)為真正的保守來自于事實(shí)和邏輯，而不是投資方式。 In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but aren't those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?" If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it.
閱讀那些投資公司的業(yè)績表格，有人可能會問：“確實(shí)，你的業(yè)績更好。但是那些投資公司難道不比你的合伙基金運(yùn)營的更保守嗎？”如果你對那些投資公司的經(jīng)理問這個問題，他們絕對會誠實(shí)的回答他們更保守。如果你問你所碰到的前100個分析師，我確信他們當(dāng)中的很大一部分也都會認(rèn)為那些投資公司更保守。但我不同意。我把我自己超過90%的凈值放在巴菲特合伙基金中。我大部分的家庭成員也差不多把90%的凈值投入了合伙基金。當(dāng)然，這只表明了我看法的真誠度，而不是證明我的看法的正確性。
It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative.
的確，那些投資公司比我們投資的方式更加傳統(tǒng)。對許多人來說傳統(tǒng)與保守沒有區(qū)別。但在我看來，這是錯誤的思維。無論是傳統(tǒng)的還是非傳統(tǒng)的方式，在本質(zhì)上都不能說是保守的。
Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts,but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society.
真正保守的行為來自于聰明的假設(shè)，正確的事實(shí)和合理的推理。這些特點(diǎn)有可能導(dǎo)致傳統(tǒng)的投資行為，但在很多時(shí)候也會指向非正統(tǒng)的方式。在世界的某個角落有些人可能仍然堅(jiān)持曾經(jīng)的“正統(tǒng)”理念，認(rèn)為地球是平的，并定期開會。
We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don't. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether conventional or unconventional – whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner.
僅僅因?yàn)橹匾宋?，評論家，或者非常多的人贊同我們，這并不能讓我們感到安心。反之，如果他們都不同意我們的做法，也并不能讓我們感到安心。民意測驗(yàn)無法替代思考。只有當(dāng)我們能理解我們的形勢，事實(shí)清晰確定，行動方案顯而易見的時(shí)候，我們才能真正放松，面帶笑容。這時(shí)候，無論傳統(tǒng)與否，無論他人同意與否，我們都認(rèn)為自己是以一種保守的方式取得進(jìn)展。
?。?964年給合伙人的信）
耐心與保密 投資需要耐心與保密。 (1)Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy.
It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, while we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.
我們的生意必須耐心。這與滿是高高在上的熱門股的投資組合不同。在這些熱門股票流行的時(shí)期，我們會顯得非常古板枯燥。
在我們購買股票的時(shí)候，這些股票的價(jià)格幾個月，甚至幾年不變，這對我們來說是個優(yōu)勢。這清楚的表明在衡量我們結(jié)果的時(shí)候，需要足夠長的時(shí)間。我們建議三年是最短的時(shí)間。
(2)We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improveour results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.”
我們不能談?wù)撐覀兡壳暗耐顿Y運(yùn)營。這種公開張揚(yáng)的政策永遠(yuǎn)也無法提高我們的結(jié)果，在某些時(shí)候還可能嚴(yán)重?fù)p害我們自己。由于這個原因，如果任何人，包括合伙人，問我們是否對某個股票感興趣，我們必須援引“憲法第五修正案”，保持沉默。
