第五，零售業(yè)的資本支出較少，不像工業(yè)企業(yè)那樣有大額的固定資產(chǎn)支出，或者像高科技企業(yè)那樣要把很大一部分收入投入研發(fā)來保持自己的競爭力（require little incremental capital to remain competitive and to grow），風(fēng)險壓力較小。
巴菲特并不厭惡零售企業(yè)，相反，零售是Berkshire的所有業(yè)務(wù)中，與manufacturing, retailing, service and finance businesses等并列的重要業(yè)務(wù)。Berkshire的零售業(yè)務(wù)主要包括家居（家具）賣場和珠寶零售，后來把喜詩糖果（See’s Candies）也并入了零售業(yè)。
巴菲特對家居賣場情有獨鐘，自1983年首次收購了Nebraska Furniture Mart后，1995-1998年間，又一連串收購了多個家居賣場，分別是R.C. Willey Home Furnishings (1995), Star Furniture (1997)和Jordan's（1998）,使Berkshire旗下的家居賣場業(yè)務(wù)成為全美最大。
巴菲特對沃爾瑪一直非常欣賞和尊敬，并連續(xù)多年在《財富》雜志“最受尊敬企業(yè)”評選中把票投給了沃爾瑪（“For several years, I have given my vote to Wal-Mart in the ballotingfor Fortune Magazine’s “Most Admired” list.”）。2003年，巴菲特收購了沃爾瑪?shù)呐l(fā)和分銷業(yè)務(wù)部門McLane，而且沒有做盡職調(diào)查，這完全是基于巴菲特對沃爾瑪?shù)男湃危ā癢e knew everything would be exactly as Wal-Mart said it would be –and it was.”）。2005年巴菲特開始建倉沃爾瑪，截至2011年，Berkshire持有沃爾瑪1.1%的股份，市值23.33億美元。另外，巴菲特還在2007年開始建倉Tesco，截至2011年，Berkshire持有Tesco 3.6%的股份，市值18.27億美元。
1995年，Berkshire收購了家居賣場R.C. Willey Home Furnishings之后，巴菲特在當(dāng)年致股東的信中描述了這場收購的過程和原因后，寫下了以下這段話：Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career, I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.（零售業(yè)的經(jīng)營相當(dāng)不易，在我個人的投資生涯中，我見過很多零售企業(yè)曾經(jīng)擁有極高的增長率和凈資產(chǎn)回報率，但之后卻突然出現(xiàn)業(yè)績跳水，甚至破產(chǎn)倒閉的情況。零售行業(yè)這種風(fēng)光一時的“流星現(xiàn)象”遠比一般制造業(yè)或服務(wù)業(yè)普遍，部分原因是零售業(yè)者必須時時保持聰明，因為你的競爭對手隨時準(zhǔn)備抄襲你的做法，然后超越你。同時新的競爭者也不斷加入，用盡各種辦法撬走你的客戶。在零售業(yè)，業(yè)績一旦下滑就注定失敗。）
因為以上這段話，使投資者對零售業(yè)產(chǎn)生了很大的疑慮。不過，巴菲特這一段話的意思并非是說零售企業(yè)不值得投資，或者自己買R.C. Willey買錯了，而是說像零售業(yè)這種必須時時保持聰明的行業(yè)里，企業(yè)有一個聰明的經(jīng)營者是必須的，如果經(jīng)營者懈怠、得過且過，則企業(yè)必定會垮。接下去巴菲特說的是，他當(dāng)年買的兩個零售企業(yè)（另一家是珠寶零售商）的CEO都非常棒，他們酷愛競爭并在長期的競爭中保持勝績（The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done so successfully for decades.）。而結(jié)論當(dāng)然是，他當(dāng)年買的這兩個零售企業(yè)，都是符合零售企業(yè)投資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的。
類似得了便宜還賣乖的說法，還屢屢出現(xiàn)在巴菲特對其主業(yè)——保險業(yè)的抱怨中。他說：The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook: hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commodity-like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high profitability levels. （保險業(yè)競爭者眾多，門檻很低，產(chǎn)品無法差異化，只有少數(shù)成本很低或者找到“利基”的企業(yè)才能保持較高的贏利水平。）
顯然，巴菲特沒有任何要放棄保險業(yè)這一核心業(yè)務(wù)的想法，而且要繼續(xù)把保險業(yè)作為主要的贏利來源，原因是保險業(yè)夠大，Berkshire的保險業(yè)務(wù)有競爭優(yōu)勢和全球范圍內(nèi)的競爭力。(Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business, which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to come. The industry is huge; in certain sectors we can compete world-wide; and Berkshire possesses an important competitive advantage.）
五、巴菲特投資零售業(yè)的邏輯
巴菲特關(guān)于家居賣場NFM和珠寶零售商Borsheim's優(yōu)勢的描述，體現(xiàn)了他零售業(yè)的投資邏輯： They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s the ideal business - one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners. （買的便宜，遠比競爭對手低的成本收入比，然后把節(jié)省下來的成本讓利給消費者。這就是最理想的生意——在給客戶創(chuàng)造額外的價值的基礎(chǔ)上，給股東創(chuàng)造額外的收益。）
Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering comparable merchandise. The store's tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes 'round and 'round. （因為銷售量夠大，所以能保持品種多樣，并把成本收入比控制在很低的水平。成本控制加上采購議價能力，使它有能力保持低價，低價又能帶來更高的銷售量，如此形成良性循環(huán)。）
他進一步總結(jié)了家居賣場NFM和珠寶零售商Borsheim's的成功之處：NFM and Borsheim's follow precisely the same formula for success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below competitors'; and (5) friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times. （遠比對手豐富的品類；極低的運營成本；買的便宜[買的便宜的原因，部分是因為采購規(guī)模，除此外還有別的原因]；比競爭對手低的售價和毛利；友好的、個性化的服務(wù)。）
總結(jié)一句話，巴菲特投資零售企業(yè)的邏輯是，選擇那些因運營成本低而具備持續(xù)給消費者讓利能力的企業(yè)（low-cost operation that allows the business to regularly offer customers the best values）。從這個角度看，國美的銷售規(guī)模與蘇寧相當(dāng)，但毛利率低于蘇寧（根據(jù)蘇寧、國美2011年報，蘇寧的綜合毛利率為19.23%，國美為18.15%，略低于蘇寧），費用率高于蘇寧（根據(jù)蘇寧、國美2011年報，蘇寧的費用率為11.95%，國美為14.27%，高于蘇寧），不具備成本優(yōu)勢，這就注定了無論有沒有黃光裕，國美都難以在長期競爭中勝出。網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物也不是通過“革命”，而是通過進一步降低成本、提高效率來取得競爭優(yōu)勢的。京東有沒有成本優(yōu)勢，要看它跟易購相比是否存在成本優(yōu)勢，否則，即使贏了蘇寧的線下實體店，也不一定贏得了蘇寧的線上業(yè)務(wù)。
巴菲特曾經(jīng)這樣比較像零售這樣的競爭性行業(yè)和有“特許經(jīng)營權(quán)”的行業(yè)的區(qū)別： In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business, there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for decades. You'd do far better, of course, if you put in Tom Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him. For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to bankruptcy. （零售行業(yè)需要時時保持聰明，否則遲早會垮掉。還有一些行業(yè)，只要買入時做對一次決定就可以了，例如，像有線電視臺這種有“特許經(jīng)營權(quán)”的行業(yè)，買入之后隨便交給一個得過且過的親戚去管，也能經(jīng)營好。）
In contrast, "a business" earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike a franchise, can be killed by poor management. （競爭性行業(yè)企業(yè)只有在成本較競爭者低，或者產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)供給不足時，才能獲得高回報。供給不足不能持續(xù)，卓越的管理可以使低成本保持很長的時間，但也會面臨持續(xù)不斷的競爭。若管理不當(dāng)，則可能招致致命的風(fēng)險。）
An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminish a franchise's profitability, but they cannot inflict mortal damage. （“特許經(jīng)營權(quán)”存在于那些產(chǎn)品或者服務(wù)是必需的或者很受歡迎、沒有替代產(chǎn)品、價格不受管制的企業(yè)中。有“特許經(jīng)營權(quán)”的企業(yè)可以持續(xù)地提價，獲取更高的回報，平庸的管理可能侵蝕其盈利能力，但不會招致致命的風(fēng)險。）
