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Tyler Cowen has a big piece about income inequality in The American Interest that's well worth reading. However, it's not really about the growth of inequality. It's about Wall Street. In particular, it's about this question: why do financial professionals make so damn much money?

在《美國(guó)利益》（American Interest）刊物上有一篇署名Tyler Cowen的關(guān)于收入不公平的文章，很值得一讀。但是，它實(shí)際上不是關(guān)于不公平現(xiàn)象的增長(zhǎng)，而是關(guān)于華爾街的。特別是關(guān)于這樣一個(gè)問(wèn)題：為什么金融專業(yè)人士能掙那么多錢。

The answer, of course, is that they work in an industry that's become ungodly profitable. But how? Tyler attributes it to the practice of "going short on volatility." That is, modern finance professionals mostly gamble that what happened in the past will keep happening in the future, and disasters will never happen. In most years this makes them a lot of money (because, in fact, disasters rarely happen).

當(dāng)然，答案就是他們所工作的行業(yè)變得不可思議地賺錢。但是如何賺呢？Tyler 將它歸因于“做空波動(dòng)性”的操作。那就是，現(xiàn)代的金融專業(yè)人士大多數(shù)賭的是，過(guò)去發(fā)生過(guò)的將來(lái)還會(huì)發(fā)生，災(zāi)難將永不發(fā)生。在大多數(shù)年份，這使他們賺了許多錢（因?yàn)槭聦?shí)上，災(zāi)難極少發(fā)生）。

But this is mysterious. After all, not everyone is going short on volatility. In fact, by definition, only half of the punters on Wall Street are doing it. The other half are taking the other side of the bet. Tyler explains this with an analogy to a bet that the Washington Wizards, one of the worst teams in basketball, won't win the NBA championship. If you make that bet year after year, you'll keep making money year after year.

但是這是難以理解的。畢竟，并不是所有人都做空波動(dòng)性。事實(shí)上，根據(jù)定義，華爾街下賭注的人只有一半這樣做。另一半人賭的是另一個(gè)方向。Tyler 用一個(gè)比喻來(lái)解釋，華盛頓奇才隊(duì)是最差的籃球隊(duì)之一，在NBA中不會(huì)奪冠。如果你每年都賭這個(gè)，你會(huì)每年都賺錢。

This is a useful analogy precisely because it wouldn't work. After all, to make that bet, you have to find someone willing to take the other side and bet that disaster will strike and the Wizards will win. But they know just how unlikely that is, so they're going to require very long odds. On a hundred dollar bet, they'll want $100 if they win but will only be willing to pay off one dollar if you win. That won't make you rich.

很清楚這是一個(gè)有用的的比喻。畢竟你要是這樣賭即需要找到其他人愿意賭另一個(gè)方向，賭災(zāi)難會(huì)發(fā)生，奇才隊(duì)會(huì)贏。但是他們知道，這是多么的不可能，所以他們就取非常長(zhǎng)期的可能性。賭注是100美元，如果他們贏，他們就想要100美元，但是如果你贏，他們只想付1美元。這樣你不可能致富。

So how can you make money doing this? Answer: find someone who doesn't know much about basketball and pays off two dollars on this bet instead of one. Additionally, you need to borrow money so you can make lots of bets. So instead of placing a $100 bet and making a dollar, you borrow a million dollars, make lots of bets on lots of teams, and make $20,000. It's the road to riches.

那么你這樣做怎么能賺錢呢？答案是：找到不太懂籃球的人，付給他2美元而不是1美元。再者，你需要借錢，你就可以下許多賭注。所以你不用放進(jìn)去100美元而只掙1美元，你借100萬(wàn)美元，對(duì)不同的籃球隊(duì)下許多賭注，可以掙20,000美元。這就是致富的路子。

The questions this raises should be obvious. First, why would anyone be dumb enough to offer you such mistaken odds? Second, shouldn't the interest on the loan wipe out the profit from such a tiny betting margin? Third, why would anyone loan you this money in the first place, knowing that you have no chance of paying it back if disaster strikes, one of your teams wins, and you lose your entire stake?

這里顯然有問(wèn)題。第一，有誰(shuí)那么傻會(huì)給你出那么錯(cuò)誤的賭注？第二，借款的利息是否會(huì)抵消掉你掙的這點(diǎn)小利？第三，如果知道一旦災(zāi)難發(fā)生你就不可能還款的情況下，誰(shuí)還會(huì)在第一時(shí)間借給你錢，你賭的其中一個(gè)隊(duì)贏，可你輸?shù)袅巳抠€注。

As near as I can tell, the answer to #1 is that Wall Street traders are bad at pricing tail risk. The answer to #2 is that Wall Street hedge funds, using techniques pioneered in the mid-90s by Long Term Capital Management, have figured out ways to borrow large sums of money at virtually no cost. And the answer to #3 is that Wall Street lenders are also bad at pricing tail risk.

我可以解釋的是，第一個(gè)問(wèn)題，華爾街的交易員們不善于為尾部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)定價(jià)。第二個(gè)問(wèn)題的答案是， 華爾街的對(duì)沖基金運(yùn)用90年代中期長(zhǎng)期資本管理公司開發(fā)的技術(shù)，計(jì)算出借大筆的錢而成本幾乎可以不計(jì)的方法。第三個(gè)問(wèn)題的答案是，華爾街的貸款人也同樣不善于為尾部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)定價(jià)。

Or are they? Tyler argues that, in fact, both sides are betting that as long as everyone is doing this, the occasional disasters will be so epically disastrous that central banks will bail them out. They have no choice, after all, if the alternative is the destruction of the global economic system. So the tail risk is smaller than you think. Borrowers will make money in good years and default in bad years. Lenders, meanwhile, will also make money in good years, secure in the knowledge that on the rare occasions when everything goes pear shaped and borrowers can't pay back their loans, the government will make them whole. As Tyler reminds us, "Neither the Treasury nor the Fed allowed creditors to take any losses from the collapse of the major banks during the financial crisis."

他們是這樣的嗎？Tyler辯稱，事實(shí)上，兩方面的人都在賭，只要每個(gè)人都這樣做，那么偶然性的災(zāi)難將成為巨大的災(zāi)難，中央銀行一定會(huì)出來(lái)解救?？傊?，如果有選擇的話那將是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)系統(tǒng)被毀，所以他們沒(méi)有選擇。所以尾部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)比你想象的要小。借款人在好的年頭會(huì)賺錢，在不好的年頭會(huì)違約。同時(shí)，貸款人也會(huì)在好的年頭賺錢，而擔(dān)保是，他們知道如果發(fā)生偶然性事件，所有的事情都很糟糕，借款人無(wú)法償還貸款，政府將全部埋單。如Tyler提醒我們的，在金融危機(jī)期間，財(cái)政部和聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)在主要的銀行破產(chǎn)時(shí)都沒(méi)有讓貸款人承受任何損失。

But I don't find this persuasive as a behavioral explanation. The problem is that there's simply no evidence I'm aware of that Wall Street executives ever thought about this or priced it into their models. Sure, they may have been reckless or stupid. However, they weren't setting prices for financial instruments based on the idea that, yes, they were taking a genuine risk of going bust, but they could price that away because they'd get bailed out by Uncle Sugar when it happened. Rather, they really, truly, believed that they weren't exposed to very much risk. As near as I can tell, this was true on both the buy side and the sell side.

但是我并不認(rèn)為這是行為學(xué)上的有說(shuō)服力的解釋。問(wèn)題是，沒(méi)有證據(jù)，我也不了解，華爾街的操盤手們?cè)?jīng)想到過(guò)或者在他們的定價(jià)模型中加入這些。當(dāng)然，他們也許不在乎或者很傻。但是他們不會(huì)以承擔(dān)真正的可能崩盤的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為基礎(chǔ)對(duì)金融產(chǎn)品定價(jià)，但是，他們可以不考慮這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)橐坏┌l(fā)生災(zāi)難性事件，美國(guó)政府（Uncle Sugar）會(huì)埋單。然而，他們真正、確實(shí)相信，他們不會(huì)暴露在非常大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中。我?guī)缀蹩梢钥隙ǖ卣f(shuō)，無(wú)論對(duì)買方還是賣方來(lái)說(shuō)，這都是真實(shí)的。

Tyler's story of private gains and socialized losses is surely true as an explanation for how the finance industry stayed highly profitable even while undergoing an epic meltdown. But I'm not sure it adequately explains why the industry became so stratospherically profitable before the meltdown. Because the problem in the pre-meltdown era wasn't that banks were taking on more and more risk, the problem was increased leverage and mispriced risk. For some reason, as Tyler puts it, "It's as if the major banks have tapped a hole in the social till and they are drinking from it with a straw."

Tyler 關(guān)于個(gè)人掙錢社會(huì)承擔(dān)損失的故事對(duì)于在經(jīng)歷了巨大的災(zāi)難之后金融業(yè)如何能夠仍然是高利潤(rùn)率的行業(yè)的解釋是真實(shí)的。但是我不肯定的是，這是否也能夠恰當(dāng)?shù)亟忉?，在金融危機(jī)之前這個(gè)行業(yè)為什么變得那么賺錢。因?yàn)?，在危機(jī)之前的問(wèn)題不是銀行承擔(dān)越來(lái)越多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，問(wèn)題是增加的杠桿和錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。由于某種原因，如Tyler 所說(shuō)，好像主要銀行已經(jīng)在社會(huì)錢柜中鉆了個(gè)洞，他們正用吸管吸錢。

This has always been one of the central mysteries of modern finance: Why is it so damn profitable? We're talking about an industry that's global, largely commoditized, and highly competitive. Profits should have been under extreme pressure for the past few decades. And yet, somehow, just the opposite was true. Against all theory, banks were able to consistently charge excessive prices; consistently take the better side of financial bets; and consistently persuade every other actor in the business that mispriced risk was, in fact, correctly priced. The result has been wild profitability and huge bonuses.

這一直是現(xiàn)代金融的核心神秘性之一。為什么它能那么賺錢？我們?cè)谡務(wù)摰氖且粋€(gè)全球化、高度商品化和高度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的行業(yè)。在過(guò)去的幾十年中，獲得利潤(rùn)是要承受很大壓力的。不知為何，事情恰恰相反。與所有理論相悖，銀行可以始終高額收費(fèi)；始終在金融賭局中抽到好簽；并且，在交易中始終能說(shuō)服所有其他各方，錯(cuò)誤的定價(jià)其實(shí)是正確的。結(jié)果是，高額利潤(rùn)和巨額的獎(jiǎng)金。

And where did this insane gusher of money come from? There are three possibilities: (1) banks created it, (2) their activities caused the economy to grow faster than it otherwise would have, and they reaped the benefit of that extra growth, or (3) it was somehow skimmed away from the rest of society. Possibility #1 is unlikely: banks certainly created mountains of debt, but mountains of money would show in skyrocketing monetary aggregates and high inflation, neither of which happened. Possibility #2 also seems unlikely. There's simply no evidence, either in comparisons over time or comparisons between countries, that economic growth over the past two or three decades has benefited from financial rocket science. So that leaves possibility #3: somehow, all this financial engineering was based on skimming money away from everyone else.

這些瘋狂噴涌的錢是從哪來(lái)的？有三種可能：(1)銀行創(chuàng)造的，(2)他們的行為使經(jīng)濟(jì)更快地發(fā)展，他們從額外的發(fā)展中獲取利益，或者(3)以某些方式從社會(huì)的其他地方搜刮出來(lái)的?？赡苄?是不可能的：銀行肯定是創(chuàng)造了大量的貸款，但是大量的錢將表現(xiàn)為快速增加的貨幣總量和高通脹，這些都沒(méi)有發(fā)生。可能性2看起來(lái)也不可能。沒(méi)有證據(jù)證明，在過(guò)去的二、三十年中，從時(shí)間上比較還是在各個(gè)國(guó)家之間比較，經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展是獲益于金融技術(shù)。那么剩下了可能性3：不管怎樣，所有的金融工程都是基于從其他任何人那里搜刮錢財(cái)。

So, in the end, Tyler's piece really is about income inequality. The incomes of the vast middle class have lagged productivity growth by a small amount each year, and that small amount has accumulated into a gigantic pool of cash that gets funneled to a tiny number of the super rich, many of them in the finance industry.

最終，Tyler的文章實(shí)際上還是關(guān)于收入不公平。龐大的中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的收入每年只增長(zhǎng)很少，落后于生產(chǎn)力的增長(zhǎng)，而這一小部分的增長(zhǎng)被累積到一個(gè)巨大的現(xiàn)金池內(nèi)，而后匯聚到極少數(shù)非常富的人手中，他們中的許多人就在金融業(yè)中。

But how? There's still a mystery here that no one has ever adequately explained. But it's important. As I've mentioned before, the primary metric for determining if financial reform is effective is the profitability of the financial industry. If it goes down a lot — by about half, I'd say — then it will have been successful. If not, then not. So far, the signs don't look good.

這又是如何形成的呢？仍然是個(gè)謎，沒(méi)有人給出恰當(dāng)?shù)慕忉?。但是這很重要。如我前面提到的，決定金融改革是否有效的主要標(biāo)準(zhǔn)就是金融業(yè)的利潤(rùn)。如果利潤(rùn)下降許多，比如說(shuō)大約一半，那么改革就是成功的。如果不是，那么就不是成功的。至少目前形勢(shì)看起來(lái)并不大好。