1996年6月，伯克希爾的主席，沃倫·愛德華·巴菲特面向A級(jí)股和B級(jí)股股東發(fā)布了名為“股東手冊(cè)”的小手冊(cè)。手冊(cè)的目的是解釋伯克希爾的基本經(jīng)營(yíng)投資原則。以下是一份修正并補(bǔ)充后的新版本。
In June 1996, Berkshire’s Chairman, Warren E. Buffett, issued a booklet entitled “An Owner’s Manual*” to Berkshire’s Class A and Class B shareholders. The purpose of the manual was to explain Berkshire’s broad economic principles of operation. An updated version is reproduced on this and the following pages.
在1983年當(dāng)我們收購(gòu)藍(lán)籌印花時(shí)，我寫下了13條股東相關(guān)的商業(yè)原則，目的是為了讓新股東了解我們的管理方法。正如名字所提到的“原則”，這13條在如今依然有效，并且將在這里以斜體字標(biāo)明。
At the time of the Blue Chip merger in 1983, I set down 13 owner-related business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our managerial approach. As is appropriate for “principles,” all 13 remain alive and well today, and they are stated here in italics.
1. 雖然我們的結(jié)構(gòu)是公司，我們的態(tài)度是合伙人制度。查理芒格和我將我們的股東視為有限合伙人，而我們則是一般合伙人。（雖然如果考慮到由于我們的持股比例，我們也是有限合伙人。）我們不將公司本身視為公司資產(chǎn)的最終持有者，而是將公司作為我們的股東持有資產(chǎn)的載體。
1. Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as ownerpartners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
查理和我希望你不會(huì)將股票認(rèn)為是價(jià)格不斷浮動(dòng)的一張紙，在某些會(huì)讓你緊張的經(jīng)濟(jì)或者政治事件出現(xiàn)時(shí)你就會(huì)拋售。我們希望你能夠?qū)⒆约阂暈楣镜挠谰霉蓶|，就像是你和家庭成員共同買入一套公寓或者是一片農(nóng)場(chǎng)時(shí)那樣。對(duì)于我們而言，我們不會(huì)將伯克希爾的股東認(rèn)為是毫無(wú)差別的，不斷變化的人群，而是一群共同投資者愿意將會(huì)影響他們未來(lái)的資金放在我們手中。
Charlie and I hope that you do not think of yourself as merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic or political event makes you nervous. We hope you instead visualize yourself as a part owner of a business that you expect to stay with indefinitely, much as you might if you owned a farm or apartment house in partnership with members of your family. For our part, we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd, but rather as co-venturers who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder of their lives.
有證據(jù)證明大部分的伯克希爾股東都接受了這樣的長(zhǎng)期合伙的概念。每年的百分比周轉(zhuǎn)率相比于其他大型美國(guó)公司的股票來(lái)說(shuō)相當(dāng)?shù)?，即使不考慮我持有的那一部分股份。
The evidence suggests that most Berkshire shareholders have indeed embraced this long-term partnership concept. The annual percentage turnover in Berkshire’s shares is a fraction of that occurring in the stocks of other major American corporations, even when the shares I own are excluded from the calculation.
在效果上，我們的股東對(duì)于伯克希爾股票的處理方式就像是伯克希爾對(duì)于她所投資的公司的處理方式一樣。比如說(shuō)，作為可口可樂或者是美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股東，我們認(rèn)為伯克希爾是這兩個(gè)優(yōu)秀公司的有限合伙人。我們衡量我們投資成功的標(biāo)志是長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的公司的進(jìn)展，而不是每個(gè)月的股票價(jià)格變動(dòng)。實(shí)際上，即使在未來(lái)幾年內(nèi)不允許股票交易，沒有股票報(bào)價(jià)，我們也完全不會(huì)在意。如果我們對(duì)長(zhǎng)期的發(fā)展感到樂觀，短期的價(jià)格變化除了能帶給我們以優(yōu)惠價(jià)格追加更多股份的機(jī)會(huì)以外，對(duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)沒有意義。
In effect, our shareholders behave in respect to their Berkshire stock much as Berkshire itself behaves in respect to companies in which it has an investment. As owners of, say, Coca-Cola or American Express shares, we think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary businesses, in which we measure our success by the long-term progress of the companies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks. In fact, we would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading, or quotation of prices, in the stocks of those companies. If we have good long-term expectations, short-term price changes are meaningless for us except to the extent they offer us an opportunity to increase our ownership at an attractive price.
2. 和伯克希爾股東為導(dǎo)向的理念相契合的是，我們的經(jīng)理的大部分凈值都屬于我們旗下公司們的股份。我們和股東站在同一戰(zhàn)線上。
2. In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation, most of our directors have a major portion of their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.
查理家庭的大部分凈值屬于伯克希爾的股票；我自己則是98%。額外的，我的許多親戚，我妹妹們和堂表兄弟姐妹，大部分的凈值屬于伯克希爾股票。
Charlie’s family has the majority of its net worth in Berkshire shares; I have more than 98%. In addition, many of my relatives – my sisters and cousins, for example – keep a huge portion of their net worth in Berkshire stock.
查理和我對(duì)于這種將雞蛋放在一個(gè)籃子里的情況習(xí)以為常。我們認(rèn)為伯克希爾商業(yè)質(zhì)量和多元化有獨(dú)特優(yōu)勢(shì)，無(wú)論她涉及的成員公司的持股多寡。
Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one-basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed, we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the businesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance.
查理和我無(wú)法承諾投資收益。但是我們可以保證你未來(lái)的收益和我們會(huì)是一樣的結(jié)果。我們對(duì)于豐厚的薪酬或者是股權(quán)，或者是從股東身上獲益沒有興趣。我們想要賺錢的情況是我們的股東也能按比例獲利。更多的，假如我做了某些愚蠢的決定，我可以從你們也在按比例的損失這件事中獲得一些心理安慰。
Charlie and I cannot promise you results. But we can guarantee that your financial fortunes will move in lockstep with ours for whatever period of time you elect to be our partner. We have no interest in large salaries or options or other means of gaining an “edge” over you. We want to make money only when our partners do and in exactly the same proportion. Moreover, when I do something dumb, I want you to be able to derive some solace from the fact that my financial suffering is proportional to yours.
3. 我們的長(zhǎng)期收益目標(biāo)（存在一些后面會(huì)提到的例外情況）是最大化伯克希爾每股的內(nèi)在商業(yè)價(jià)值的平均年化收益。我們并不從伯克希爾整體的規(guī)模的表現(xiàn)或者是經(jīng)濟(jì)影響力考慮，而是著重于每股的變化。我們認(rèn)為在未來(lái)，每股的收益表現(xiàn)會(huì)逐漸減弱。當(dāng)管理的資金額度增加時(shí)，這種情況會(huì)浮現(xiàn)。但是，我們覺得如果未能超出美國(guó)大型企業(yè)的收益平均值是一件令人失望的事情。
3. Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future – a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
4. 我們的首要的投資偏好是直接持有一系列多元化的，能夠產(chǎn)生資金并且能持續(xù)提供超出美國(guó)平均值資本收益率的公司。我們的第二備選是通過(guò)我們的保險(xiǎn)公司在公開市場(chǎng)上買入擁有這種特性的公司的一部分股票。股票的價(jià)格，市場(chǎng)成交量，以及保險(xiǎn)公司的資金需求決定著每一年的資產(chǎn)分配情況。
4. Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
在近些年我們進(jìn)行了一系列的收購(gòu)。雖然未來(lái)有些年份的收購(gòu)事件不會(huì)像現(xiàn)在這么多，我們期望在未來(lái)數(shù)十年收購(gòu)的頻率會(huì)增加，并期望會(huì)出現(xiàn)大型的收購(gòu)事件。如果這些收購(gòu)的質(zhì)量能和歷史上曾發(fā)生過(guò)的相似，那么伯克希爾足以能夠從此頗為獲益。
In recent years we have made a number of acquisitions. Though there will be dry years, we expect to make many more in the decades to come, and our hope is that they will be large. If these purchases approach the quality of those we have made in the past, Berkshire will be well served.
對(duì)于我們的挑戰(zhàn)是在我們已經(jīng)快速產(chǎn)生了現(xiàn)金流之后如何以相同速度找到新的投資想法。在這一點(diǎn)看來(lái)，一個(gè)表現(xiàn)低迷的股票市場(chǎng)會(huì)對(duì)我們產(chǎn)生巨大的優(yōu)勢(shì)。原因之一，這些時(shí)期內(nèi)完全收購(gòu)公司的價(jià)格會(huì)降低。原因之二，低迷的市場(chǎng)能讓我們的保險(xiǎn)公司以優(yōu)惠的價(jià)格買入優(yōu)秀的公司的股份，這也包括增持已有的股份。原因之三，歷史上，優(yōu)秀公司一直都是自己的股票的長(zhǎng)期買家，這意味著我們能像他們一樣都能從低價(jià)中受益。
The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash. In this respect, a depressed stock market is likely to present us with significant advantages. For one thing, it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become available for purchase. Second, a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of wonderful businesses – including additional pieces of businesses we already own – at attractive prices. And third, some of those same wonderful businesses are consistent buyers of their own shares, which means that they, and we, gain from the cheaper prices at which they can buy.
總體來(lái)說(shuō)，伯克希爾和他的長(zhǎng)期股東將會(huì)從一個(gè)低迷的股票市場(chǎng)中收益更多，就像是去超市買食品的人能從折扣中獲益。當(dāng)股市劇跌時(shí) - 而這會(huì)經(jīng)常發(fā)生 – 別恐慌或者哀悼。這對(duì)伯克希爾是好事。
Overall, Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets – as it will from time to time – neither panic nor mourn. It’s good news for Berkshire.
5. 因?yàn)槲覀冸p管齊下的投資策略，以及傳統(tǒng)會(huì)計(jì)方法的限制，合成財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的收入可能反映的并不是我們真實(shí)的財(cái)務(wù)表現(xiàn)。查理和我，既是有限合伙人又是一般合伙人，基本上不在意合成財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的數(shù)據(jù)。盡管如此，我們會(huì)通報(bào)每一個(gè)控股的大型的公司的收益。那些我們認(rèn)為非常重要的數(shù)據(jù)。這些數(shù)據(jù)，和其他一系列我們投資的公司的信息，應(yīng)該能夠幫助你了解他們的經(jīng)營(yíng)情況。
5. Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
簡(jiǎn)單來(lái)說(shuō)，我們將會(huì)給你那些重要的年報(bào)的數(shù)據(jù)和其他重要數(shù)據(jù)。查理和我會(huì)仔細(xì)留意我們的公司的表現(xiàn)，我們也會(huì)努力了解每個(gè)公司的背后的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)情況。比如說(shuō)，我們的子公司中所處的行業(yè)是否出現(xiàn)了利好或利空的情況。查理和我需要了解哪種情況占多數(shù)，并且以此調(diào)整我們的市場(chǎng)預(yù)期。我們也會(huì)將我們的結(jié)論公布給股東。
To state things simply, we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter. Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing, and we also work to understand the environment in which each business is operating. For example, is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is it facing a headwind? Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations accordingly. We will also pass along our conclusions to you.
長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看，絕大部分的子公司的表現(xiàn)都超出了我們的預(yù)期。但是有時(shí)候我們也會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)一些令人失望的情況，我們會(huì)盡可能坦白這些信息，就像我們和你們坦白我們的好消息一樣。當(dāng)我們使用了非傳統(tǒng)的計(jì)量方法記錄我們的進(jìn)展時(shí) – 比如說(shuō)，你會(huì)在我們的年報(bào)中讀到關(guān)于浮存金的信息 – 我們會(huì)盡可能解釋這些概念，并且告訴你們?yōu)槭裁催@些信息很重要。換一句話說(shuō)，我們相信，通過(guò)告知你們我們的分析方法，你們不僅可以能夠評(píng)估伯克希爾子公司的質(zhì)量，而且能夠評(píng)估我們的管理和資產(chǎn)分配方法。
Over time, the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations. But sometimes we have disappointments, and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences. When we use unconventional measures to chart our progress – for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance “float” – we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important. In other words, we believe in telling you how we think so that you can evaluate not only Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management and capital allocation.
6. 會(huì)計(jì)上的結(jié)果并不會(huì)影響我們的經(jīng)營(yíng)或者資產(chǎn)分配的決策。當(dāng)收購(gòu)成本是相似的，我們寧愿收購(gòu)那些，無(wú)法被財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表記錄的，但能帶來(lái)2美元的收益的公司，也不愿意收購(gòu)那些，能被財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表記錄，但只能帶來(lái)1美元收益的公司。這其實(shí)是我們常常在收購(gòu)中需要面對(duì)的選擇題，因?yàn)橥耆召?gòu)一家公司（收益能夠完全被財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表記錄）比起部分買入時(shí)（收益大部分無(wú)法被記錄）的收購(gòu)成本要按比例高出一倍。總體來(lái)看長(zhǎng)期而言，我們期望未計(jì)入財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的收入能以股票的價(jià)格上漲的形式反映在我們的內(nèi)在價(jià)值中。
6. Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
我們發(fā)現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看，來(lái)自我們的被投資公司的凈利潤(rùn)不論是否分配的，從總體上對(duì)于伯克希爾都是同樣有利的，盡管如果分配到伯克希爾就意味著能夠記錄在伯克希爾的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中。這樣優(yōu)異的結(jié)果源自于我們的大部分被投資公司都是能夠?qū)①Y本完善利用的優(yōu)秀公司。他們要么將資本用于自身經(jīng)營(yíng)，要么用于回購(gòu)自己的股份。很顯然，并不是每一次資本的決策都能有利于作為股東的伯克希爾，但是總體上我們從他們留存收益中獲得的收益遠(yuǎn)高于留存收益本身。我們因此將紙面收益認(rèn)為是符合事實(shí)的年度經(jīng)營(yíng)收益反映。
We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees, in aggregate, have been fully as beneficial to Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us (and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report). This pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often employ incremental capital to great advantage, either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their shares. Obviously, every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders, but overall we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained. We consequently regard look-through earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations.
7. 我們不常舉債，但當(dāng)我們確實(shí)需要貸款時(shí)，我們嘗試著使用長(zhǎng)期，固定息票利率的債券。我們寧愿錯(cuò)失機(jī)會(huì)也不想過(guò)度使用杠桿。這種保守的投資方式對(duì)我們的收益產(chǎn)生了一定影響，但是這是我們唯一能夠接受的方式。這是考慮到了我們對(duì)于保險(xiǎn)客戶，債權(quán)人，以及投入大量資本的股東的代理人義務(wù)（一位印第安納波利斯500英里比賽的冠軍車手曾說(shuō)過(guò)：“想要第一個(gè)到達(dá)終點(diǎn)，第一你必須得到達(dá)終點(diǎn)”）
7. We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care. (As one of the Indianapolis “500” winners said: “To finish first, you must first finish.”)
查理和我使用的投資策略使得我們并不會(huì)犧牲睡眠質(zhì)量而獲得高上幾個(gè)百分比的收益。我從不愿意冒著失去我家人和朋友所需要的事物的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而爭(zhēng)取他們并不需要的。
The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few extra percentage points of return. I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to pursue what they don’t have and don’t need.
此外，伯克希爾有兩個(gè)低成本低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的融資渠道來(lái)形成財(cái)務(wù)杠桿，用以持有遠(yuǎn)比我們的權(quán)益資本更高的資產(chǎn)：遞延所得稅和保險(xiǎn)浮存金。保險(xiǎn)浮存金是我們的保險(xiǎn)公司暫存的客戶的資金，因?yàn)楸ｋU(xiǎn)公司需要預(yù)收客戶的保金以備未來(lái)的索賠。這兩個(gè)融資渠道一直都在快速的增長(zhǎng)，目前總價(jià)值已經(jīng)達(dá)到了大約1680億美金。
Besides, Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float,” the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $168 billion.
更好的一點(diǎn)是，這些融資到目前為止都是無(wú)成本的。遞延所得稅義務(wù)不存在利息。而只要我們能在保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)做到收支平衡，經(jīng)營(yíng)過(guò)程的產(chǎn)生浮存金也是無(wú)成本的。不過(guò)他們兩者都不屬于權(quán)益，而被會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則記為義務(wù)。但是他們都是不存在契約條件或者是截止日期的。在效果上，他們提供了債務(wù)般的優(yōu)勢(shì) – 讓更多的資產(chǎn)為我們服務(wù)的能力 – 但是不存在債務(wù)那些令人不快的缺點(diǎn)。
Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they give us the benefit of debt – an ability to have more assets working for us – but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.
當(dāng)然了，這并不意味著我們也能在未來(lái)以零成本的方式使用我們的保險(xiǎn)浮存金。但是我們認(rèn)為我們能夠使用浮存金的機(jī)會(huì)和其他保險(xiǎn)公司一樣多。我們不僅在過(guò)去達(dá)到了這樣的目標(biāo)（盡管你們的董事長(zhǎng)犯下了多次重要的錯(cuò)誤），由于我們?cè)?996年對(duì)于政府雇員保險(xiǎn)公司的收購(gòu)，我們?cè)谖磥?lái)能夠達(dá)到這個(gè)目標(biāo)的可能性也很大。
Of course, there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost. But we feel our chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business. Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman), our 1996 acquisition of GEICO, materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future.
我們目前的經(jīng)營(yíng)方式讓我們能夠在公共事業(yè)以及鐵路公司進(jìn)行使用額外的，不存在追索權(quán)的貸款。所以我們將繼續(xù)傾向于使用長(zhǎng)期，固定利率貸款。
In our present configuration we expect additional borrowings to be concentrated in our utilities and railroad businesses, loans that are non-recourse to Berkshire. Here, we will favor long-term, fixed-rate loans.
8. 管理層不會(huì)做出為滿足個(gè)人愿望而犧牲股東利益的事情。我們不會(huì)以多元化為理由，溢價(jià)完全收購(gòu)對(duì)股東們并沒有長(zhǎng)期收益的公司。我們將你們的資本視為自己的資本，在公開市場(chǎng)上進(jìn)行多元化投資是出于為你們的投資組合帶來(lái)附加價(jià)值為前提的。
8. A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
查理和我只會(huì)收購(gòu)會(huì)增加伯克希爾股票的每股內(nèi)在價(jià)值的公司。我們的工資和伯克希爾的公司規(guī)模無(wú)關(guān)。
Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s stock. The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet.
9. 我們認(rèn)為重大決策都應(yīng)該進(jìn)行周期性的評(píng)估。我們?cè)u(píng)估是否派發(fā)股息的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是，分析我們留存的每一美元是否帶來(lái)至少一美元的股價(jià)變化。在目前為止，伯克希爾能夠通過(guò)這項(xiàng)測(cè)試。我們將在未來(lái)持續(xù)進(jìn)行這種對(duì)于過(guò)去五年的累計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)估。雖然，在我們凈值不斷增加后，能夠有效地使用留存收益就變得愈發(fā)困難。
9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
我應(yīng)該換一個(gè)“過(guò)去五年”的說(shuō)法。這是我一個(gè)直到2009年股東大會(huì)上遇到一次相關(guān)的提問(wèn)后才意識(shí)到的錯(cuò)誤。
I should have written the “five-year rolling basis” sentence differently, an error I didn’t realize until I received a question about this subject at the 2009 annual meeting.
當(dāng)股市出現(xiàn)連續(xù)五年的下跌，有時(shí)候我們的股票價(jià)格相對(duì)于賬面價(jià)值的溢價(jià)會(huì)減小。在這種情況出現(xiàn)時(shí)，伯克希爾的將無(wú)法通過(guò)之前提到的檢驗(yàn)。實(shí)際上，在我1983年寫下這些原則之前，在1971-1975年期間，我們的股價(jià)曾遠(yuǎn)低于賬面價(jià)值。
When the stock market has declined sharply over a five-year stretch, our market-price premium to book value has sometimes shrunk. And when that happens, we fail the test as I improperly formulated it. In fact, we fell far short as early as 1971-75, well before I wrote this principle in 1983.
五年測(cè)試應(yīng)該是這樣：（1）在這段期間內(nèi)我們的賬面價(jià)值增長(zhǎng)超過(guò)了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾的增長(zhǎng)，以及（2）我們的股價(jià)是否能持續(xù)的高出每股賬面價(jià)值，意味著每1美金的留存收益是否能帶來(lái)超出1美元的價(jià)值？如果這些測(cè)試能夠滿足，不派發(fā)股息的行為是合理的。
The five-year test should be: (1) during the period did our book-value gain exceed the performance of the S&P; and (2) did our stock consistently sell at a premium to book, meaning that every $1 of retained earnings was always worth more than $1? If these tests are met, retaining earnings has made sense.
10. 我們?cè)霭l(fā)普通股的情況只會(huì)是我們能夠獲得的價(jià)值能和我們犧牲的價(jià)值一樣多。這個(gè)法則應(yīng)用于所有類型的增發(fā) – 不僅包括并購(gòu)或者公開募股，也包括股債轉(zhuǎn)換，股權(quán)，以及可轉(zhuǎn)換證券。如果這一行為無(wú)法帶來(lái)更大的價(jià)值，我們不會(huì)將公司的部分價(jià)值賣給外人 – 在股票增發(fā)時(shí)這種情況會(huì)發(fā)生。
10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance – not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company – and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to – on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
當(dāng)我們?cè)?996年售出B級(jí)股時(shí)，我們聲明伯克希爾的股票并沒有被低估，但是有些人并不相信。但他們本不應(yīng)該。他們應(yīng)該在我們的股價(jià)被低估的時(shí)候?qū)υ霭l(fā)感到驚訝。管理層在公開募股的時(shí)候明示或者暗示股價(jià)被低估，要么是對(duì)于事實(shí)的不重視或者是對(duì)于股東資產(chǎn)的不重視：如果將實(shí)際價(jià)值1美元的資產(chǎn)以80美分賣出，這對(duì)股東來(lái)說(shuō)是一筆不公平的損失。我們?cè)谑鄢鯞級(jí)股的時(shí)候沒有犯這種錯(cuò)誤，在將來(lái)我們也不會(huì)。（但是，我們也未曾在增發(fā)時(shí)提到過(guò)我們的股票被高估，這些言論來(lái)自于很多媒體在報(bào)道時(shí)的誤解。）
When we sold the Class B shares in 1996, we stated that Berkshire stock was not undervalued – and some people found that shocking. That reaction was not well-founded. Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our stock was undervalued. Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’ money: Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for 80￠ that in fact are worth $1. We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will. (We did not, however, say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued, though many media have reported that we did.)
11. 你應(yīng)該完全注意到了查理和我有著一種對(duì)于投資收益表現(xiàn)不利的投資態(tài)度：不管別人給出怎么樣的價(jià)格，我們對(duì)于伯克希爾持有的績(jī)優(yōu)公司都沒有賣出的打算。我們也非常不愿意賣出表現(xiàn)不好的公司，只要他們能夠至少產(chǎn)生一定現(xiàn)金，而且我們對(duì)他們的管理層和勞務(wù)關(guān)系依然感到滿意。我們希望自己不會(huì)重復(fù)那些會(huì)讓我們買下表現(xiàn)不佳的公司的投資錯(cuò)誤。我們對(duì)于那些認(rèn)為表現(xiàn)欠佳的公司在大量的資本投入以后未來(lái)經(jīng)營(yíng)會(huì)改善的觀點(diǎn)也相當(dāng)謹(jǐn)慎。（有些預(yù)測(cè)聽起來(lái)很合理，提出這一理論的人們也是發(fā)自內(nèi)心的，但是，在最后，大部分在夕陽(yáng)行業(yè)中的額外投資就像是在流沙中掙扎。）盡管如此，金拉米牌式的管理方式（每一輪拋棄一個(gè)表現(xiàn)最差的子公司）并不是我們的風(fēng)格。我們寧愿犧牲一部分總體平均收益，也不愿進(jìn)行這種行為。
11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.
我們將持續(xù)避免這種金拉米牌式的行為。確實(shí)，我們?cè)?0年代放棄了掙扎了20年的紡織公司，但只是因?yàn)槲覀冋J(rèn)為它將會(huì)在未來(lái)繼續(xù)永遠(yuǎn)處在虧損的情況。我們未曾考慮過(guò)出售那些能賣出好價(jià)格的子公司或者是拋棄我們那些進(jìn)展欠佳的子公司，盡管我們會(huì)想辦法處理那些會(huì)導(dǎo)致他們表現(xiàn)欠佳的問(wèn)題。在這里，我們想澄清一些在2016年出現(xiàn)過(guò)的一些誤解。我們?cè)谶@里強(qiáng)調(diào)不出售原則是指我們控股的子公司，而不是我們持有的適銷證券。
We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior. True, we closed our textile business in the mid-1980’s after 20 years of struggling with it, but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses. We have not, however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards, though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag. To clean up some confusion voiced in 2016, we emphasize that the comments here refer to businesses we control, not to marketable securities.
12. 我們會(huì)坦陳地向你通報(bào)業(yè)績(jī)，強(qiáng)調(diào)我們所擁有的公司的優(yōu)與劣。我們的指導(dǎo)方針是告訴你們那些如果換位思考我們會(huì)想要知道的信息。這些信息必不可缺。更何況，作為一個(gè)持有一家主流的新聞媒體公司的大公司，在通報(bào)業(yè)績(jī)時(shí)使用比新聞工作者向他人報(bào)道時(shí)更低的精確度，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，以及深度是不可饒恕的。我們同時(shí)相信誠(chéng)實(shí)對(duì)于作為管理者的我們是有幫助的：誤人者終誤己
12. We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
在伯克希爾，你不會(huì)遇到巨額沖銷的會(huì)計(jì)操縱手法，或者是重組，或者是任何季度或者年度報(bào)告的平滑處理。假如我們是在打高爾夫，我們將誠(chéng)實(shí)說(shuō)明我們用了多少桿才進(jìn)洞，并從不會(huì)設(shè)法擺弄計(jì)分板。當(dāng)我們不得不使用非常粗略的估計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)時(shí)，比如保險(xiǎn)的準(zhǔn)備金，我們會(huì)想盡力保證估計(jì)方法的一致和保守。
At Berkshire you will find no “big bath” accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any “smoothing” of quarterly or annual results. We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard. When the numbers are a very rough “guesstimate,” as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving, we will try to be both consistent and conservative in our approach.
我們會(huì)以多種方式與你們溝通。通過(guò)年度報(bào)告，我會(huì)努力以合理的篇幅盡可能地詳細(xì)提供所有公司的價(jià)值信息。我們同時(shí)也會(huì)盡量提供一些已經(jīng)在網(wǎng)上公布過(guò)的簡(jiǎn)短但重要的季度報(bào)表的信息，雖然那些并不是我寫的（演唱會(huì)一年舉辦一次足夠了）。另一個(gè)重要的溝通渠道就是我們的年度股東大會(huì)，在那時(shí)候查理和我非常樂意用五個(gè)小時(shí)以上的時(shí)間回答關(guān)于伯克希爾的問(wèn)題。但是有一個(gè)溝通方式我們辦不到：一對(duì)一的方式?？紤]到伯克希爾上千的股東數(shù)量，這種方式不可行。
We will be communicating with you in several ways. Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value-defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length. We also try to convey a liberal quantity of condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet, though I don’t write those (one recital a year is enough). Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting, at which Charlie and I are delighted to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire. But there is one way we can’t communicate: on a one-on-one basis. That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners.
在我們所有的溝通渠道中，我們想公平對(duì)待我們所有的股東：我們不想用行業(yè)普遍的做法，給分析師或者大股東收益數(shù)據(jù)或者重要信息的提示。我們的目標(biāo)是讓所有的股東同時(shí)獲得信息。
In all of our communications, we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge: We do not follow the usual practice of giving earnings “guidance” or other information of value to analysts or large shareholders. Our goal is to have all of our owners updated at the same time.
13. 盡管我們的政策強(qiáng)調(diào)坦白，我們對(duì)于適銷證券的信息披露只會(huì)停留在法律要求的程度。良好的投資機(jī)會(huì)，就像是良好的產(chǎn)品和商業(yè)收購(gòu)機(jī)會(huì)一樣，既稀有又珍貴，而且容易被捷足先登。所以我們一般不會(huì)公開談?wù)撐覀兊耐顿Y想法。關(guān)于這項(xiàng)內(nèi)容的保密也涵蓋我們已經(jīng)出售的證券（因?yàn)槲覀兾磥?lái)可能還會(huì)買）以及大家誤以為我們會(huì)買的證券。如果我們對(duì)于這些謠言予以否決但是對(duì)于其他情況表示“無(wú)可奉告”，不評(píng)論也就變成了承認(rèn)。
13. Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
盡管我們會(huì)繼續(xù)對(duì)個(gè)股的選擇的公布有所保留，我們?cè)敢夤_談?wù)撐覀兊纳虡I(yè)和投資哲學(xué)。我從本杰明·格雷漢姆慷慨的知識(shí)分享中受益匪淺。他是金融史上最偉大的老師，所以我認(rèn)為我應(yīng)該將我從他身上學(xué)到知識(shí)繼續(xù)傳遞給他人，盡管這么做會(huì)為伯克希爾產(chǎn)生新的潛在有利競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者，就像本杰明曾經(jīng)遇到的情況一樣。
Though we continue to be unwilling to talk about specific stocks, we freely discuss our business and investment philosophy. I benefitted enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest teacher in the history of finance, and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as Ben’s teachings did for him.
14. 盡可能地，我們希望伯克希爾的股東在股票價(jià)值的損益變化是和股東所有權(quán)的內(nèi)在價(jià)值的損益變化是一致的。為了能達(dá)到這一點(diǎn)，內(nèi)在價(jià)值和市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的關(guān)系需要保持一致，而我們偏好的關(guān)系是1比1。這也就隱含了，我們寧愿看到伯克希爾的股價(jià)是處于公允價(jià)值而非高價(jià)。很明顯，查理和我無(wú)法控制伯克希爾的股價(jià)。但是通過(guò)我們的政策和溝通，我們能夠鼓勵(lì)知情達(dá)理的股東們共同促成一個(gè)理性的價(jià)格。我們既不愿意高估和低估股價(jià)的方式可能會(huì)讓某些股東失望。但是我們相信，這能夠吸引想要從伯克希爾的商業(yè)發(fā)展中獲利而不是從其他投資者的錯(cuò)誤中獲利的長(zhǎng)期投資者。
14. To the extent possible, we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period. For this to come about, the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant, and by our preferences at 1-to-1. As that implies, we would rather see Berkshire’s stock price at a fair level than a high level. Obviously, Charlie and I can’t control Berkshire’s price. But by our policies and communications, we can encourage informed, rational behavior by owners that, in turn, will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational. Our it’s-as-bad-to-be-overvalued-as-to-be-undervalued approach may disappoint some shareholders. We believe, however, that it affords Berkshire the best prospect of attracting long-term investors who seek to profit from the progress of the company rather than from the investment mistakes of their partners.
15. 我們周期性的將伯克希爾的每股賬面價(jià)值變化和標(biāo)普500的表現(xiàn)對(duì)比。長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看，我們希望我們能跑贏這個(gè)基準(zhǔn)。否則，投資者何必選擇我們？但是這個(gè)衡量方法存在一定的短板，在下一部分會(huì)提到。更多的，現(xiàn)在年度的表現(xiàn)的對(duì)比沒有以前那么有意義了。那是因?yàn)槲覀兊某钟械墓煞莺蜆?biāo)普500的關(guān)聯(lián)越來(lái)越小了。同時(shí)，標(biāo)普的收益計(jì)算是不考慮成本的，而伯克希爾的收益在考慮稅收后只有65%。我們因此期望在市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)低迷時(shí)跑贏標(biāo)普，在市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)優(yōu)異時(shí)被標(biāo)普擊敗。
15. We regularly compare the gain in Berkshire’s per-share book value to the performance of the S&P 500. Over time, we hope to outpace this yardstick. Otherwise, why do our investors need us? The measurement, however, has certain shortcomings that are described in the next section. Moreover, it now is less meaningful on a year-to-year basis than was formerly the case. That is because our equity holdings, whose value tends to move with the S&P 500, are a far smaller portion of our net worth than they were in earlier years. Additionally, gains in the S&P stocks are counted in full in calculating that index, whereas gains in Berkshire’s equity holdings are counted at 65% because of the federal tax we incur. We, therefore, expect to outperform the S&P in lackluster years for the stock market and underperform when the market has a strong year.
現(xiàn)在讓我們注意力放在之前提到的一個(gè)概念，這是你們將在未來(lái)的年度報(bào)告中持續(xù)將會(huì)看到的概念。
Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports.
內(nèi)在價(jià)值是一個(gè)各方面都非常重要的概念。它是唯一作為評(píng)估商業(yè)相對(duì)投資價(jià)值的邏輯方法。內(nèi)在價(jià)值可以被簡(jiǎn)單定義為：從一個(gè)公司中能得到的未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流的折現(xiàn)后的價(jià)值。
Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.
但是現(xiàn)金流的計(jì)算并不是那么簡(jiǎn)單。我們的定義暗示著，內(nèi)在價(jià)值是一種估計(jì)而非準(zhǔn)確計(jì)算，而且數(shù)據(jù)需要按利率變化和現(xiàn)金流預(yù)測(cè)的改變而不斷調(diào)整。更何況，對(duì)于同樣的事實(shí)，兩個(gè)不同的人可能會(huì)有不同的結(jié)論，即便是查理和我都會(huì)有所不同。這也是我們不會(huì)給你們我們對(duì)于內(nèi)在價(jià)值估計(jì)的原因之一。不過(guò)我們的年報(bào)會(huì)提供所有我們?cè)谟?jì)算內(nèi)在價(jià)值時(shí)用到的信息。
The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover – and this would apply even to Charlie and me – will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures. That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value. What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.
同時(shí)，我們會(huì)周期性的公布我們的每股賬面價(jià)值，一個(gè)更容易被計(jì)算的數(shù)據(jù)，雖然具體效果并不好。缺點(diǎn)并不存在于適銷證券上，適銷證券的賬面價(jià)值直接等于市場(chǎng)價(jià)格。賬面價(jià)值的缺點(diǎn)存在于我們的控股子公司的情況。在這些場(chǎng)合中，有時(shí)候賬面價(jià)值和實(shí)際的內(nèi)在價(jià)值的偏離的相當(dāng)遠(yuǎn)。
Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values.
這種偏離可以出現(xiàn)在兩個(gè)方向上。比如在1964年我們可以說(shuō)伯克希爾的每股賬面價(jià)值是19.46美金。但是這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)將大幅高估公司的內(nèi)在價(jià)值，因?yàn)楣镜乃匈Y源都困在一個(gè)并不怎么賺錢的紡織公司里。我們的紡織業(yè)資產(chǎn)在持續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)的前提或者是在破產(chǎn)清算的前提下的計(jì)算出的內(nèi)在價(jià)值都不等于他們的賬面價(jià)值。然而，今天，伯克希爾的情況恰好相反，賬面價(jià)值遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低估了內(nèi)在價(jià)值。這是因?yàn)槲覀儞碛械淖庸镜膬?nèi)在價(jià)值遠(yuǎn)高于他們的賬面價(jià)值。
The disparity can go in either direction. For example, in 1964 we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the company’s intrinsic value, since all of the company’s resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. Today, however, Berkshire’s situation is reversed: Now, our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value.
盡管他們呈現(xiàn)事實(shí)的能力有限，我們還是將伯克希爾的賬面價(jià)值數(shù)據(jù)展現(xiàn)出來(lái)，因?yàn)樗麄円廊豢梢宰鳛榇致缘?，盡管大幅度低估的，內(nèi)在價(jià)值衡量標(biāo)尺。換一句話說(shuō)，賬面價(jià)值的每年變化率可以被認(rèn)為合理接近于內(nèi)在價(jià)值的變化率。
Inadequate though they are in telling the story, we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.
如果你想要了解賬面價(jià)值和內(nèi)在價(jià)值的區(qū)別，大學(xué)教育可以作為一個(gè)投資的例子。大學(xué)的學(xué)費(fèi)是賬面價(jià)值。更準(zhǔn)確的說(shuō)法是，它應(yīng)該還包括讀大學(xué)期間不能工作而損失的工資。
You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a college education. Think of the education’s cost as its “book value.” If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.
為了方便說(shuō)明，我們?cè)谶@里忽略大學(xué)帶來(lái)的非經(jīng)濟(jì)性收益，而僅關(guān)注經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。首先我們需要評(píng)估大學(xué)畢業(yè)生一生將會(huì)獲得的工資收入，然后減去如果沒有讀大學(xué)能得到的收入。這個(gè)超額的收入，在按照一定的利率經(jīng)過(guò)折現(xiàn)到該學(xué)生的畢業(yè)日。計(jì)算出來(lái)的結(jié)果就是大學(xué)教育的內(nèi)在經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.
有些畢業(yè)生會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)大學(xué)教育的賬面價(jià)值高于內(nèi)在價(jià)值，也就意味著大學(xué)的學(xué)費(fèi)花的不值得。在其他的情況下，教育的內(nèi)在價(jià)值遠(yuǎn)高于賬面價(jià)值，這個(gè)結(jié)果能證明資本被有效的利用了。無(wú)論如何，你可以明白賬面價(jià)值和內(nèi)在價(jià)值的關(guān)聯(lián)并不大。
Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
我認(rèn)為我應(yīng)該在最后談一下伯克希爾當(dāng)前以及未來(lái)的管理層結(jié)構(gòu)。就像我們的第一條股東原則說(shuō)的那樣，查理和我是伯克希爾的一般合伙人。但是我們將復(fù)雜的管理職責(zé)放權(quán)給了我們子公司的經(jīng)理。實(shí)際上我們幾乎相當(dāng)于完全棄權(quán)了：雖然伯克希爾有36.7萬(wàn)員工，總部只有25位。
I think it’s appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire’s management, today and in the future. As our first owner-related principle tells you, Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 367,000 employees, only 25 of these are at headquarters.
查理和我主要關(guān)注資本的分配以及經(jīng)理的管理和生計(jì)問(wèn)題。他們之中的大多數(shù)都是偏好自己全權(quán)打理公司，這也是我們對(duì)于經(jīng)理的默認(rèn)管理方法。這將使得他們?nèi)珯?quán)管理公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)策略和以及保留收益的額度。當(dāng)他們將現(xiàn)金交給我們后，他們將不會(huì)因?yàn)樾枰芾眍~外的資金而被誘惑。更多的，查理和我，相對(duì)于我們的經(jīng)理在他們自己的行業(yè)內(nèi)，有更多的投資機(jī)會(huì)。
Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don’t get diverted by the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off. Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers could find in his or her own industry.
我們的經(jīng)理的大部分已經(jīng)達(dá)到了財(cái)富自由，這也就需要讓我們培養(yǎng)一種能讓他們?yōu)椴讼柟ぷ鞫皇侨ゴ蚋郀柗蚧蛘哚烎~的企業(yè)文化。這意味著我們需要公平對(duì)待他們，設(shè)身處地為他們著想。
Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it’s therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed.
而在資產(chǎn)分配這件事上，這是一個(gè)查理和我都樂意做而且已經(jīng)積累了一定經(jīng)驗(yàn)的事情。一般來(lái)說(shuō)，年齡并不會(huì)影響我們的發(fā)揮：你不需要非常好的動(dòng)作協(xié)調(diào)性，或者是發(fā)達(dá)的肌肉來(lái)管理資本（感謝上天）。只要我們的大腦能夠有效的運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，查理和我可以像我們?cè)谝郧澳菢永^續(xù)工作下去。
As for the allocation of capital, that’s an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful experience. In a general sense, grey hair doesn’t hurt on this playing field: You don’t need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past.
在我死后，伯克希爾的股東結(jié)構(gòu)將會(huì)改變，但是不會(huì)產(chǎn)生破壞性影響：我的股份都不會(huì)用于遺產(chǎn)的分配或者納稅。我的其他財(cái)產(chǎn)足以應(yīng)付遺產(chǎn)要求。所有的伯克希爾股份將會(huì)按每年相同數(shù)量分配給多個(gè)基金會(huì)。
On my death, Berkshire’s ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: None of my stock will have to be sold to take care of the cash bequests I have made or for taxes. Other assets of mine will take care of these requirements. All Berkshire shares will be left to foundations that will likely receive the stock in roughly equal installments over a dozen or so years.
在我的死后，巴菲特家族不會(huì)參與公司的管理，但是作為大股東，將會(huì)參與選拔和監(jiān)督公司的經(jīng)理。那些經(jīng)理將會(huì)是誰(shuí)將取決我什么時(shí)候離開。但是我可預(yù)測(cè)管理層的結(jié)構(gòu)將是：基本上我的職責(zé)將會(huì)被分為兩個(gè)部分。一個(gè)總經(jīng)理將會(huì)成為CEO并且管理日常經(jīng)營(yíng)。投資的職責(zé)將會(huì)交給一個(gè)或者多個(gè)總經(jīng)理。如果有新的收購(gòu)項(xiàng)目，這些總經(jīng)理在必要時(shí)刻，在董事會(huì)的許可下，共同作出決策。我們將繼續(xù)維持以股東為導(dǎo)向的董事會(huì)，他們的利益會(huì)和你們保持一致。
At my death, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business but, as very substantial shareholders, will help in picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I can anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts. One executive will become CEO and responsible for operations. The responsibility for investments will be given to one or more executives. If the acquisition of new businesses is in prospect, these executives will cooperate in making the decisions needed, subject, of course, to board approval. We will continue to have an extraordinarily shareholder-minded board, one whose interests are solidly aligned with yours.
如果處于某些原因，我們需要立刻執(zhí)行我剛剛提到的管理層結(jié)構(gòu)，董事會(huì)知道我在兩個(gè)部分的候選人是哪些。所有的候選人要么已經(jīng)在伯克希爾工作，要么隨時(shí)可以為伯克希爾辦公。他們都是我完全信任的人。我們的管理者名單處于史無(wú)前例的最佳狀態(tài)。
Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, our directors know my recommendations for both posts. All candidates currently work for or are available to Berkshire and are people in whom I have total confidence. Our managerial roster has never been stronger.
我會(huì)持續(xù)向董事會(huì)報(bào)告候選人情況。因?yàn)椴讼柺俏业娜控?cái)產(chǎn)，而且將會(huì)成為日后長(zhǎng)時(shí)間作為多個(gè)基金會(huì)的資產(chǎn)，所以你可以放心相信董事會(huì)和我認(rèn)真考慮過(guò)并且準(zhǔn)備好了候選人的問(wèn)題。同樣你可以相信我們一直以來(lái)應(yīng)用的股東原則將會(huì)在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)著我的繼承人，我們有效而鮮明的企業(yè)文化也將繼續(xù)維持。作為額外的保障，我相信在我不再是CEO時(shí)將巴菲特家族的一名成員作為不收工資的非執(zhí)行董事成員會(huì)是一個(gè)好辦法。具體是否會(huì)采納將取決于那時(shí)董事會(huì)的決定。
I will continue to keep the directors posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entire estate and will account for a similar portion of the assets of various foundations for a considerable period after my death, you can be sure that the directors and I have thought through the succession question carefully and that we are well prepared. You can be equally sure that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me and that our unusually strong and well-defined culture will remain intact. As an added assurance that this will be the case, I believe it would be wise when I am no longer CEO to have a member of the Buffett family serve as the non-paid, non-executive Chairman of the Board. That decision, however, will be the responsibility of the then Board of Directors.
盡管我們談了這么多不愉快的事情，我還是想告訴你們我從未像現(xiàn)在這樣感到開心。我熱愛管理伯克希爾。如果熱愛生活的人會(huì)長(zhǎng)壽，那么瑪士撒拉的長(zhǎng)壽記錄可能將會(huì)被我打破。
Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying life promotes longevity, Methuselah’s record is in jeopardy.
沃倫·愛德華·巴菲特
董事長(zhǎng)
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman
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